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"Other Worlds are Actual":
Tully on the Imperial Roles of Modern
Constitutional Democracy
MICHAEL SIMPSON *
The globalization of modern legal and economic practices has not ushered in a state of
perpetual peace as Kantians have famously predicted. Rather, it has reinforced the perpetual
crises and violence that is today's realm of the political. This article examines James Tully's
claim that the formalization of diverse legal traditions into the modular confines of modern
constitutions, as nation-states and international taw, is a project of today's imperial hegemony.
The global imperialism of modern constitutionalism is one that suppresses the vast
multiplicity of existing legal pluralities and, consequently, fuels war and aggression, not
perpetual peace. Tully's important analysis of the imperial roles of modern Law is understood
in the broader contexts of his work on constitutionalism and contemporary debates in the
disciplines of legal and political theory. The author provides support for Tully's optimism
that law and politics can potentially be decolonized by opening up to the worlds and legal
pluralities that are constantly being re-'created in the everyday practices, interactions, and
relationships of people situated in their own unique localities worldwide. Numerous
examples of where these "other worlds" can be seen are offered.
La mondialisation des usages juridiques et 6conomiques modernes n'a pas ouvert [a voie
un 6tat de paix perp6tuelle, comme Les kantiens l'ont notoirement pr6dit. Loin de l : e!le a
accentu6 Les crises et la violence perp6tuelles qui constituent aujourd'hui [a sphere de La
politique. Cet article examine l'affirmation de James Tully, selon laquelLe [a formalisation
de traditions juridiques diverses dans Les confins modulaires des constitutions modernes,
comme Les Etats-nations et le droit international, est un projet de l'h~g6monie imp6rialiste
contemporaine. L'imp6rialisme mondial du constitutionalisme moderne supprime [a vaste
multiplicit6 des pluralit6s juridiques existantes et par cons6quent attise les guerres et
provoque les agressions, plut6t que d'engendrer la paix perp~tuelle. L'analyse importante
que fait Tully des r6les imp6rialistes du droit moderne se comprend dans le contexte plus
large premi6rement de son travail sur te constitutionalisme, deuxi~mement des d6bats
contemporains dans [a discipline de [a th6orie juridique et de la th6orie politique. L'auteur
conforte l'optimisme de Tully selon lequel le droit et la politique peuvent potentiellement
6tre d6colonis~s en s'ouvrant aux mondes et aux pluratit6s juridiques quotidiennement
recr6s dans les usages, interactions et relations de personnes situ6es dans leurs propres
* Researcher in Political and Legal Theory, University of Victoria.
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tocatit6s uniques du monde entier. De nombreux exemples d'endroits o6 on peut voir ces o
autres mondes >> sont donn6s.
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THE STORY OF MODERNITY in the twenty-first century may still be in its
opening scenes, yet it seems clear that this is not just another repackaged 1990s
tale set at the end of history or in a harmonious stage of non-history. Following
closely on the heels of a century noted for its devastating brands of warfare,
rationalized violence, and systematized destruction, modernity's triumph over
its colonial underside does not look likely. If anything, the global imperial
project is intensifying and gaining steam in the midst of a perpetual War on
Terror, staggering global inequalities, global corporate hegemony, the steady
rollback of established civil liberties, and looming threats of ecological
catastrophe. After fuelling some 500 years of colonial violence, the project
of modernity remains unfinished and now scuttles frantically towards its
self-proclaimed telos.'
Rather than politely avoiding the ongoing problems of violence and
destruction in our times, James Tully's "Modern Constitutional Democracy
and Imperialism" offers important and timely reflections that drive straight to
the seriousness of these matters.2 Tully casts a critical perspective on the
1. Philosophers in the modern tradition from Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel through to Jurgen Habermas and Francis Fukuyama have long theorized the coming
of a final stage towards which the evolutionary history of human societal development is
headed. This telos of the modern project-variously deemed "perpetual peace," Geist, or the
"end of history"-is generally depicted as a global age characterized by the rule of liberal
democratic states and international law. Others in the Marxist tradition ranging from Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels through to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have envisioned
this telos as communism or a classless society. What these narratives share as modern
philosophies is the underlying consensus that human history is progressing toward some
future world historical end-state that can be theoretically deduced and empirically
demonstrated in advance.
2. James Tully, "Modern Constitutional Democracy and Imperialism" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 461 [Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism"].
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modern western tradition's most cherished and least questioned institutions by
asking what role modern constitutional democracy has played, and continues to
play, in perpetuating longstanding patterns of imperialism and violence.
These are potentially very destabilizing and unsettling questions. Yet
Tully's peek beneath the veil of the modern tradition's foundations uncovers a
stunning multiplicity of beautiful worlds, each exhibiting their own unique
strengths and limitations. Tully embraces a spirit of trust rather than distrust
towards these worlds. His approach seeks and affirms plurality, rather than
denying it. His optimism is inspired by the wealth of diversity that he observes
in the world and makes a powerful call for us to open our thoughts and hearts
to these many alternatives and traditions from which we all can learn.
My intention in this article is to explicate some of the underlying themes
and implications of Tully's approach to constitutionalism and imperialism. I
will carefully explore the arguments made in "Modern Constitutional Democracy
and Imperialism" and locate these arguments in the broader contexts of Tully's
work, as well as in legal and political theory. The first section focuses on two
key features of his argument: first, that modern law is premised on a degree of
formality or disembeddedness between itself and its subjects; and second, that it
is founded on the concept of unformed constituent power. These characteristics
of modern constitutional law not only give rise to a paradox in its philosophical
foundations, but rely upon imperialism to overcome this paradox, particularly
when modern constitutional law's theoretical form is applied to the existing
world. Consequently, the foundational paradox of modern constitutional
democracy is its imperial paradox.
The second section draws out some implications of this argument by
situating it in relation to the broader questions of freedom in western political
philosophy. In contrast to modern conceptions that place the sphere of
democratic freedom within universal and unquestionable limits or foundations,
Tully puts forward an account of freedom inspired by Wittgenstein.
3 On this
account, the limits of freedom emerge immanently through the ongoing practice
of the rules and customs themselves, and are thus always open to contestation
and modification by practising these rules creatively or "acting otherwise." This
3. James Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy" in Cressida Heyes, ed., The Grammar
of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)
[Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy").
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is the approach to democracy and freedom that Tully has developed since
Strange Multiplicity,4 which he terms democratic constitutionalism.
The final section demonstrates that Tully's view of freedom reveals an
underlying tapestry of fluidly changing relational fabrics that lies beneath the
surface upon which the project of modern constitutionalism is inscribed. This
world is embedded in the everyday practices of people interacting in relations
unmediated by the relational forms offered by modern constitutions and legal
institutions. Viewed from this perspective, the modern constitutional project
seeks to contain this fluid world within fixed and stable limits, but can never
fully emulate or capture its amorphous form. This world constantly erupts
through the fissures and points of rupture in the modern project, and must be
constantly harnessed and restrained in order to retain the semblance of
structural integrity. Consequently, the project of democratic constitutionalism
is one of strengthening and expanding existing pockets of creative possibility
where these "other worlds" of non-imperial, democratic relations are being
practised and are always emerging. In closing, I indicate where such worlds
can be found.
I. THE IMPERIAL PARADOX OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
The idea that the institutions and structures commonly recognized as those of
constitutional democracy might perpetuate global imperialism may seem
counterintuitive, given that these very institutions are often heralded as the
necessary alternative to colonial injustice.5 Tully's approach in making a case for
this relationship is both hermeneutical and historical. First, he excavates a series
of underlying assumptions that make the modern constitutional project
philosophically possible. Next, he demonstrates that historically, where this
philosophical project has been applied to real world contexts, it has relied on
imperial technologies of governance that persist up to the present day. The
combination of these critical hermeneutic and historical approaches provides an
4. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) (Tully, Strange Multiplicity].
5. See e.g. Jiirgen Habermas, "Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a
Chance?" in Jiirgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) 115
[Habermas, "Still Have a Chance?"].
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opportunity to reassess the philosophical basis of constitutionalism in such a
way that could render it non-imperial.6
As a place to begin exploring the particular characteristics that ground the
modern project of constitutional democracy, Tully addresses an ofr-noted
paradox that has pestered this tradition since its early origins. Roughly stated,
this paradox holds that: (1) modern constitutional forms are said to gain
legitimacy from the consent of a pre-constitutional people; while at the same
time (2) such a "people" require a constitutional form through which to
exercise their constituent power legitimately. The modern constitutional
tradition is born from this tension of wanting to maintain an equal foundational
commitment to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and democracy-
what has been described as the law's facticity and its normativity.7
Yet, the two fundamental principles of the modern constitutional
tradition have proven difficult to maintain simultaneously, especially in the
many cases where a people do not freely choose to subject themselves to modern
western-style constitutions and institutions of representative democracy in some
foundational moment. Ultimately, if institutions of representative government
do not arise from a pre-civil people, there are two possibilities. Modern
constitutions and legal structures may be forcefully imposed on the "crooked
timber" of the people in order to grant them the constituent powers of
'democracy. 8 Alternatively, the people are destined to remain outside of the
6. Aspects of this approach are detailed in James Tully, "Political Philosophy as a Critical
Activity" (2002) 30 Pol. Theory 533 [Tully, "Political Philosophy"]; James Tully, "The Pen
is a Mighty Sword" in James Tully, ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his
Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) 7.
7. For instance, see Jirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse
Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) [Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms]; Jiirgen Habermas, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason" in Ciaran
Cronin & Pablo de Greiff, eds., The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) 49; and John Rawls, "Lecture IX: Reply to Habermas"
in Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 372. For a helpful
summary and critical analysis of this exchange between Rawls and Habermas as well as an
earlier formulation of the paradox that emerges from this exchange, see James Tully, "The
Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of Constitutionalism and
Democracy" (2002) 65 Mod. L. Rev. 204 at 205 [Tully, 'Unfreedom of the Moderns"].
8. See e.g. Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795)" in Ted
Humphrey, ed., Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
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formal structures of law, thereby discrediting their collective will as uncivilized,
pre-modern, or undeveloped and ultimately illegitimate. This paradox of people
requiring modern democratic structures of law prior to being able to exercise
their democratic will collectively is precisely what renders -the tradition of modern
constitutional democracy imperial. The paradox of modern constitutional
democracy is thus the colonial paradox of its philosophical foundations.
Legal philosophers have grappled with this problem since the dawn of
modern constitutional theory, spanning the efforts of Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau through to those of John Rawls and JiIrgen
Habermas. Numerous philosophical and rhetorical devices have been employed
in the various efforts to escape this paradox, including ahistorical accounts of
the "laws of nature," historical stages theories of development or modernization,
and hypothetical concepts such as a "general will," "original position," "ideal
speech situation," or the "inherent telos" of language use. Yet, despite these
many storied attempts, the paradox of modern constitutional democracy still
lingers at large.
Rather than furthering the endless efforts to solve this paradox, Tully's
hermeneutic approach draws out the assumptions and conditions that make this
very paradox possible. Indeed, if the project of modern constitutional democracy
rests on paradoxical foundations, then it is not unreasonable to ask whether
there might be an inconsistency internal to its philosophical underpinnings.
Accordingly, Tully's approach is to dissolve the paradox of modern constitutional
democracy by carefully describing the key features that distinguish this tradition
as only one possible way of imagining how constituent powers and constitutional
forms can be arranged,
For instance, Tully reminds us that the modern conception of a constitutional
form is particular insofar as it refers to a formally enshrined set of laws that
stands over and apart from the everyday interaction of those who are subject to
it-what Tully terms the "formality or autonomy condition" of civil law. 9 The
law is conceived of as disembedded or separated from those subject to it insofar
as it remains unchanged by their everyday rule-following practices or patterns
of interaction. Modern law is thought to constitute the underlying basis of
Company, 1983) 107 [Kant, "Perpetual Peace"]; Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal
History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (1784)" in Ted Humphrey, 29.
9. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 466.
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everyday interactions and relations between citizens rather than emerging
immanently from these practices. Modification of the law requires an appeal to
formally institutionalized spheres such as a court or legislature, which again
stand apart, separated from everyday fields of practice. The constitutional laws
to which the modern citizen is subject are effectively alienated from the citizen
in a manner reminiscent of Marx's description of the modern worker's
alienation from the product of their labour under the formal property and wage
labour regimes of capitalism.1"
This disembedded conception of the law is foundational to the modern
tradition of constitutional democracy. The tradition of modern law actually
refers to this feature to distinguish itself from all other legal traditions that lack
such formality and are thereby deemed customary law. However, as Tully
demonstrates, if modern conceptions of law "did not have this degree of
autonomy or formality there would not be the 'paradoxical' relationship
between the rule of law and constituent powers at its centre."
1 Indeed, if law
were conceptualized as being grounded in practices, it would be impossible to
conceptualize the paradox of a people living in the absence of a constitutional
form. Even where the particular features of modern constitutionalism are not
found, the constitutional form is understood as existing in ever-changing and
emerging practices and situated interactions.
A second philosophical feature of modern constitutionalism that makes this
paradox possible is the "distinctly modern idea of constituent power as a capacity
or potentiality, prior to taking on a concrete form."
2 The modern narrative of
sovereignty relies on this idea of the people being able to stand back from any
established constitutional form and, acting in unison, impose a constitutional form
upon themselves in a founding contractual moment. As Tully notes, "It]his modern
concept of unformed constituent power is, of course, the condition of possibility
of the modern idea of popular sovereignty"'
3 without which we would not have
the paradoxical relationship between popular sovereignty and the rule of law."
10. See James Tully, Public Philosophy in. a New Key: Volume 2, Imperialism and Civic Freedom
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 243 [Tully, Public Philosophy].
11. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 466.
12. Ibid. at 469.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
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Again, however, Tully coaxes us to move away from thinking of the forms
in which people organize themselves as something abstracted from the everyday
forms of individuals' interactions. It then becomes clear that we are already
within a framework of rules (e.g. Wittgenstein's language games, which taken
together could be said to comprise a constitutional form). As Tully notes,
"[e]ven the concept of constituent power as popular sovereignty already
recognizes these powers under a concept and thus presupposes a form and is
one step away from the distinctly modern idea."' 5 Consequently, the idea of a
people exercising constituent power without that power taking any actual form
becomes nonsensical since "the constitutional form is the form that the
constituent powers take."' 6
The combination of these features-the formality condition and the concept
of unformed constituent powers (buttressed by the six subsequent features
described by Tully)-sets the philosophical conditions that give rise to the
foundational paradox of modern constitutional democracy. The philosophical
project of modern constitutional democracy subsequently requires imperialism
to overcome its basic paradox when applied to the everyday interactions of the
social world.17 On this account, when peoples choose not to subject themselves
15. Ibid. at 468-69.
16. Ibid. at 468 [emphasis in original]. Indeed, the idea of people collectively exercising
constituent powers without those powers constituting any actual form is so difficult to
conceptualize that even within the modern tradition it has remained largely ambiguous.
Early social contract theorists referred to this original condition in which people were said to
exist in the absence of any constitutional form or constituent powers-i.e. in the absence of
any coherent social structure-as a "state of nature." However, more recent theorists of this
tradition seem to have conceded that, at best, such a situation of a people acting collectively
without any existing constitutional form could only ever be considered as a hypothetical
situation. For instance, Rawls's neo-Lockean theory ofjustice invites us to consider such an
"original position" as a thought experiment in abstraction from our existing social localities.
See Rawls, supra note 7. Similarly, Habermas concedes that his abstract conception of an
"ideal speech situation," where communicative action can occur unhindered by any social
impediments aside from the "unforced force" of the better argument and the inherent laws of
language, can only be practically employed as a regulative ideal with which to evaluate
existing practices. See Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse
Ethics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993) at 51. Of course, these hypothetical exercises are
fraught with their own conceptual difficulties.
17. As Tully's third feature states, modern constitutional democracy "requires some kind of
master or legislator to impose law on the crooked timber of the people and to act without
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to these disembedded structures of modern constitutional law and western-style
institutions of modern nation-states, they are seen to exist without any coherent
constitutional form. Such peoples are thus assumed to be incapable of exercising
their constituent powers of self-determination until modern legal structures are
granted to them by others who have already been civilized by the rule of law.
18
The long histories of colonization and decolonization during the modern age
attest to the fact that formal legal structures of constitutional democracy must
be imposed on people throughout the world (by formal or informal means)
before international law will legitimately consider them self-determining
nations. 9 As nicely captured by Tully, constitutionalism precedes democracy
within the modern tradition.
Consequently, -the foundations of modern constitutional democracy are
undemocratic and imperial insofar as they attempt to constitute the social field
of interactive practices rather than being constituted by (or emerging from) this
field itself. It is thought that self-determination can literally be "granted to"
indigenous peoples by imposing "formal" constitutional law and institutions on
top of and in the place of established indigenous forms of governance.2" The
their consent and independent of law in exceptional circumstances until they are 'civilized' by
centuries of subjection to civil law." See Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 472.
18. See e.g. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," supra note 8. For a more recent formulation, see Habermas,
"Still Have a Chance?", supra note 5.
19. Just as earlier laws of empire (such as lex mercatoria or merchant law) only recognized other
competing empires as legitimately sovereign nations, the current institutions of global
governance recognize only those belonging to a world system of nation-states as legitimately
self-determining nations under international law. They constitute modern states insofar as
they recognize (or fail to recognize) their legitimacy as actors in the international sphere.
Thus, we can see that the constitutions of modern nation-states and the constitutions of
these systems of international law beyond the state arose together in this way, or are
equiprimordial. For further elaboration on this point, see R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside:
International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border
Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). An excellent overview of the
colonial history of international law can be found in Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also James Tully, Understanding Imperialism Today
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) [forthcoming in 2009].
20. This is justified within the tradition by discursive narratives of historical development or
modernization which contend that indigenous forms of customary law were merely at an
earlier stage in their progress towards eventually becoming modern legal structures in any
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paradoxical foundations of modern constitutionalism are thus shown to be
precisely those that also render this specific constitutional form imperial. The
paradox of modern constitutional democracy is the imperial paradox. As such,
any political philosophy that overlooks, downplays, or takes for granted its own
paradoxical foundations can only do so at the cost of failing to engage seriously
with the violence characteristic of modern constitutional democracies-not
only throughout their histories but at present as well.
II. "ACTING OTHERWISE": THE AGONISTIC ARTS OF FREEDOM
At base, this becomes a conceptual question about freedom for Tully, who
demonstrates that the freedom offered by colonial modernity is a foundational
form of freedom, permitted within the fixed boundaries of an underlying
framework that remains largely concealed and shielded from critical reflection
or contestation.21 As Wittgenstein would say, such freedom is "closed by a
frontier."22 Hence Tully begins with a significant discussion of Ronald Robinson
and John Gallagher's insights into the imperialism of free trade. 23 By considering
how free trade permits freedom within the dominant structures of the global
capitalist marketplace, Tully seeks to establish a parallel with the freedom of
self-determination offered by formal decolonization. This freedom is only
permitted to occur within the narrow institutional confines of self-determining
nation states and the established bodies of international law (themselves derived
case (Tully's seventh feature). See Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2. Even
once subjected to a set of modern legal structures, only some peoples are ever recognized as
legitimately sovereign nations under international law. Consider, for example, the
Indigenous peoples of Canada who, in most instances, are granted access to the institutions
of international law only via the representative of their broader geographical riding in the
government of Canada.
21. See e.g. James Tully, "To Think and Act Differently: Foucault's Four Reciprocal Objections
to Habermas' Theory" in Samantha Ashenden & David Owen, eds., Foucault contra
Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue between Genealogy and Critical Theory (London: Sage,
1999) 90 [Tully, "To Think and Act Differently"]; Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political
Philosophy," supra note 3 at 17; and James Tully, "The Agonic Freedom of Citizens" (1999)
28 Econ. & Soc'y 161 [Tully, "The Agonic Freedom"].
22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1978) at 28.
23. Ronald Robinson & John Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade" (1953) 6 Econ. Hist.
Rev. 1.
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from colonial law) that govern the global system of states. In both cases,
freedom exists within the predetermined, non-negotiable, and purportedly
universal structures of capitalist markets and the modern nation-state system
(each of which presents strict institutional limitations on how this freedom can
be legally enacted). In both cases, imperialism persists.
As early as 1953, Robinson and Gallagher recognized what many have
come to intuitively understand today-that free trade offers only a very
restricted and galling freedom that perpetuates imperial economic relations
(freedom within a structure of domination).2" Yet political scientists seldom
recognize that the same can be said about the formal legal and political
structures of modern western-style constitutional nation-states and international
law. These structures, characteristic of formal decolonization, establish a new
set of unquestionable and militarily enforced institutional conditions within
which the foundational freedom of self-government is permitted. These
modular institutions are largely modelled after the colonial forms that they are
intended to replace. The constitutional form shifted in the transition from
colonial to post-colonial institutional structures or from monopoly capitalism
to free trade. Each nevertheless offers a restricted foundational freedom and
allows imperialism to persist in the absence of colonialism and in the name of
freedom or democracy.25
From here, one could contend that such foundational conceptions of
freedom are actually reflective of a deep-seated metaphysical tendency towards
foundationalism in western philosophy. Tracing the history of western
philosophy and metaphysics, one could attempt to understand the origins and
history of the transcendental search to uncover abstract, idealized forms
(whether this be forms of freedom, truth, being, or morality) and the subsequent
attempts to structure the world in accord with these abstractions by imprinting
them back upon the world itself. While this metaphysical project has taken an
array of different forms throughout the history of western philosophy, the
modern period can be characterized as being- driven by an exceptionally
hyper-rationalized drive to discover the indisputable universal limits of science
24. Ibid.
25. See James Tully, "On Law, Democracy and Imperialism" in Emilios Christodoulidis &
Stephen Tierney, eds., Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism
(London: Ashgate, 2008) 69 (Tully, "Law, Democracy and Imperialism"].
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or reason. Once established philosophically, however, these limits must be
imposed back upon the world coercively and then forcefully policed wherever
the world does not quite adhere. Seeking to remake the world in their own
image, these abstracted philosophical forms are inscribed onto the physical
landscape and enforced with violence, as with the examples of property lines or
the territorial borders of modern constitutional democracies.26
One could argue that the problem with the freedom of modern
constitutional democracy may be a reflection of an underlying shortcoming
with the philosophical outlook and cultural experience of modernity itself,
expressed as a question of constitutional democracy only insofar as it adheres to
this modernist worldview. However, Tully is less interested in engaging in an
esoteric debate over whether or not modernity can be salvaged than he is
concerned with the concrete question of whether constitutional democracy is
imperial at its core or whether it can be de-imperialized. This question has been
central to much of Tully's work on constitutionalism since his Seeley Lectures
at Cambridge in 1994, which later formed the basis of Strange Multiplicity.27
26. Granted, each specific constitutional project is characterized by unique features that
distinguish it from others, just as each conceals its own unique history explaining how that
constitutional project came to take the specific form that it has in any given locality. One
cannot deny the importance of these features. For the purpose of the argument presented
here, what renders any one of these diverse projects a particular instantiation of the broader
modular form that we call "modern constitutional democracy" is its general adherence to the
eight characteristics outlined by Tully. Such projects may be deemed imperial insofar as this
abstract theoretical model of constitutionalism has been forcefully imposed upon a pre-
existing social fabric, either by way of formal (colonial) or informal (post-colonial imperial)
means. For an excellent example of this type of argument, see Mignolo, supra note 19. For
particularly disastrous examples of how these modernist efforts to remake the world
according to their own abstract schemes have repeatedly failed, see James C. Scott, Seeing
Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
27. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, supra note 4 at 5. Tully describes the modern western
constitutional tradition as an "imperialist yoke galling the necks of the culturally diverse
citizenry" and proceeds to develop a non-imperial approach to "contemporary
constitutionalism." For other examples of Tully's approach to democratic constitutionalism,
see Tully, "Unfreedom of the Moderns," supra note 7; James Tully, The Unattained Yet
Attainable Democracy: Canada and Quebec Face the New Century (Montreal: McGill
University, Programme d'6tudes sur le Quebec, 2000) [Tully, "The Unattained Yet
Attainable Democracy"]; James Tully, "Introduction" in Alain-G. Gagnon & James Tully,
eds., Multihational Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1; James
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Tully's response is to save constitutional democracy from its modern
variant. He does so by demonstrating that the narrow meaning that has come
to be associated strictly with the term is just one way of imagining the specific
form that constitutional democracy might possibly take if considered broadly.
His careful description of the particular features of modern constitutional
democracy serves not only to demonstrate that the tradition rests on a particular
set of (paradoxical) philosophical assumptions, but to also deflate the often
unquestioned claim that this particular conjuncture of constituent power and
constitutional form is a universal configuration according to which all examples
of constitutional democracy must adhere by their very definition.
If a constitution is not to be conceived of as something abstracted that
stands above an unformed constituent group of people, then perhaps it can be
conceived in broader terms as the wide-ranging fields of interaction, understood
as rules and customs that emerge, are established, are contended with, and change
through the very practices of everyday interactive rule-following itself. Indeed,
the idea that we are always already within language games (or rule-guided social
relations) was precisely Wittgenstein's important hermeneutic point (at which
he arrived only after rejecting his own ambitious Augustinian efforts to generate
an overarching, abstract theory that could account for all aspects of language
use like a calculus operating according to definitive rules).
28 In addition, Tully
points to the insights of twentieth-century practice-based philosophy to help
explain how we are always situated in an interactive and overlapping tapestry of
everchanging practices that guide and make sense of social interaction in the
absence of a closed frontier or foundation.29
Conceiving of constitutionalism in this broad manner avoids having to
adhere to the problematic philosophical conceptions of modern constitutional
Tully, "The Challenge of Reimagining Citizenship and Belonging in Multicultural and
Multinational Societies" in Catriona McKinnon & lain Hampsher-Monk, eds., The
Demands of Citizenship (London: Continuum, 2000) 212; and James Tully, "Recognition
and Dialogue: The Emergence of a New Field" (2004) 7 Crit. Rev. Int'l Soc. Pol. Phil. 84
(Tully, "Recognition and Dialogue"].
28. Wittgenstein, supra note 22.
29. Tully associates this tradition of practice-based western philosophy with a lineage ranging
from Heidegger to Pierre Bourdieu and Charles Taylor. For other important works within
this tradition, see e.g. Michel de Certeau, The Practices of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984); Theodore R. Schatzki, Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach
to Human Activity and the Social (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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democracy. For instance, it avoids succumbing to the formality condition's
conception of disembedded law that is separated off from its practitioners.
Instead, the rule of law can be seen as emerging from everyday interactions and
practices. Effectively, the constitutional rule of law is the changing background
horizon of customs and rules or language games that both emerge from and
make sense of these practices and interactions: in Tully's words, the "countless
normative relationships of interaction (non-formal customary laws) that
humans and non-humans both bear and transform en passant." 3
This practice-based approach also avoids the problem of accounting for the
paradox of an unconstituted people exercising constituent powers. If a people
are always situated within interactive relations of shared meaning, then they are
thereby already interacting and understanding on the rough ground of customs
and rules that guide and make sense of these practices. These established
customs and patterns of interaction, which both arise from and make sense of
our everyday practices, are our ever-changing ontological condition. They make
sense of who we are in the world, thereby constituting us as a people. They can
never be abstracted from the world, nor can we step outside of them.31
Widening our conceptions of constitutional democracy not only avoids
falling prey to the imperial paradox of modern constitutional democracy, but
also has sweeping implications for how constitutional democracy is to be
understood in practice. Broadly conceived, "constitutional democracy" refers to
"any legal and political order that has some kind of constitution and democracy. "32
This includes the world's diverse, indigenous traditions that have historically
been disregarded by the modernist project as less-advanced forms of customary
law and have-An the name of civilization, development, and freedom--been
made subject to the formal legal structures and institutions of modern
constitutional democracy through the ongoing processes and technologies of
colonization and imperialism.
30. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 469.
31. Endorsing the rules and customs that emerge through everyday interaction of practitioners
does not deny that a normative order is posited. Rather it democratizes the normative order
that is being posited by opening its background horizon to critical contestation. Similarly,
consider that Wittgenstein does not deny that words have meaning even if that meaning
emerges from language use itself rather than being posited objectively prior to the actual
conduct of language games.
32. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 465, n.7.
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Modern constitutionalists might oppose relinquishing the concept of
constitutional democracy to such a wide-ranging array of indeterminate
practices and traditions. Doing so would remove the solid ground of a fixed
and determined foundation from the formal institutional spaces of freedom and
democracy. It is claimed that these institutional foundations have already been
universally legitimated by the "prior learning processes" and "advances" of the
world's existing liberal democracies." Opening these foundations of freedom
and democracy to critique could be understood as unleashing the spectre of
relativism, thereby creating an opening for any dubious form of social order,
including fascism, to stand on an equal ground with liberal democracy.
In response, it is important to clarify that while the freedom described by
Tully may not hinge on any transcendental or unquestionable foundation,
neither is it a completely uninhibited or groundless liberty. Rather, Tully's is an
embodied and embedded freedom, situated and grounded in the background
tapestry of c6nventions, rules, and customs that are established and modified
through the very practice of freedom itself, just as language derives meaning
from its use as practised within language games. As in Wittgenstein's account,
any established guiding norm may sit in the background unquestioned one
moment, only to be drawn to the foreground and contested from the
background horizon of other established norms the next.34 Although no one
aspect of the background framework of conduct and understanding withstands
critique and acts as a permanent indisputable ground or foundation, this anti-
foundationalist approach cannot be equated with a brand of relativism where
anything goes.
Tully's non-foundational concept of civic freedom leads not to relativism,
but to a democratic and participatory freedom cradled within the security of
ongoing and always-open situated practices. Indeed, if the experience of violence
in the twentieth century has taught us anything, it is that the so-called customary
traditions of indigenous people of the world have not created the greatest and
harshest modes of violence. Rather, as an earlier generation of Frankfurt School
philosophers understood, the most refined and horrendous examples of violence
have been those systematic acts perpetrated by hyper-militant forms of
foundationalism and modernism that have employed relentless force to impose
33. Habermas, "Still Have a Chance?", supra note 5 at 140-41.
34. See Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," supra note 3.
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their philosophically derived and rationalized limits and categories back upon a
world that never quite seems to fit.3"
This conception of freedom is characteristic of the distinct approach to
constitutionalism that Tully has developed since Strange Multiplicity.6 Termed
"democratic constitutionalism," as opposed to constitutional democracy, this
approach leaves no constitutional foundation immune from democratic
dialogue or critical contestation. This includes the structures and procedures of
negotiation, dialogue, and contestation themselves. Where the institutional
form through which citizens exercise their freedom is not open to democratic
contestation, the structures remain undemocratic and citizens remain subjects
who are not free. In contrast, Tully describes a non-imperial relation as follows:
A democratic answer is to work to bring the basic constitutional and constituent
structures that are employed in these three roles under the shared participatory
authority of those who are subject to them. This is the basic idea of democratic
freedom and democratic constitutionalism: the laws must always be open to the
criticism, negotiation, and modification of those who are the subjects of them as they
follow them... [T]his participatory and reflexive freedom of negotiating the norms
to which we are subject en passant is at the heart of non-modern, customary
constitutional forms and immanent constituent powers. The formalisation and
disembedding of modern constitutionalism and constituent powers displaced this
freedom to representative institutions.
37
This concept of freedom and democracy has also informed other aspects of
Tully's work, from his approach to questions of recognition, his critique of
Habermas and deliberative democracy,3 his conception of philosophy as a
35. While all foundationalist manners of thought conceal inherent violence and must therefore
be approached cautiously and skeptically, those foundationalist tendencies that become
equipped with the modern machinery capable of advanced, systematic destruction are the
most dangerous and have proven capable of wielding the most widespread devastation.
36. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, supra note 4.
37. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 488. For further elaboration on Tully's
distinction between constitutional democracy and democratic constitutionalism see Tully,
Strange Multiplicity, ibid.; Tully, "Unfreedom of the Moderns," supra note 7; and Tully, The
Unattained yet Attainable Democraty, supra note 27.
38. Tully's democratic constitutionalism can be broadly distinguished from Habermas's theory
of deliberative democracy insofar as the latter approach is to establish idealized (i.e.
philosophically prescribed) conditions or limits within which communication is permitted to
take place that are closed off to democratic dialogue. See e.g. Tully, "To Think and Act
Differently," supra note 21; Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," supra note 3.
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critical and public activity, and his more recent focus on bringing the imperial
present into view as a "mode of problematisation." '39
III. OTHER WORLDS ARE ACTUAL
In "The Imperial Roles of Modern Constitutional Democracy," Tully expands
beyond his previous work on some of the most striking implications of his
Wittgensteinian approach to freedom and constitutionalism. For instance, once
constitutions are broadly understood as the fluidly changing relational fabrics in
which we are always engaged, it becomes clear that the modern constitutional
project is one that strives to place these ever-shifting forms into the closed
structures of an abstracted model. In other words, the theoretically-abstracted
moulds of modernity are imposed upon the fluid world of customary practices
that they seek to juridically contain but can never fully capture. A world of
embedded practices thus always already exists beneath the surface upon which
the modern project is inscribed."0
This is the interactive quality of Tully's sixth feature of modern constitutional
democracy. 1 As Tully notes, the modern state and informal imperial order
maintain a wide assemblage of strategies of juridical containment that they
employ in "re-naming and responding to the irruptions of popular sovereignty,
Additionally, Tully's pluralism allows for a wide-ranging multiplicity of public spheres or
localities in which democratic deliberation may occur, as opposed to the singular and
uniform public sphere that Habermas's approach seeks to construct. See Habermas, Between
Facts and Norms, supra note 7 at 8. Tully's public philosophy remains compatible enough to
establish a working relationship with deliberative democrats. See e.g. Tully, Public Philosophy,
supra note 10 at section five, feature two. However, his philosophy does not restrict public
spheres to deliberation divorced from civic action.
39. See e.g. Tully, "Recognition and Dialogue," supra note 27; Tully, "To Think and Act
Differently," supra note 21; Tully, "Political Philosophy," supra note 6; and Tully, "Law,
Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 25.
40. These existing nomoi are not different in kind, but only in degree, from more formalized
legal orders. As Tully has argued since Strange Multiplicity, constitutions are seen as an
ongoing dialogue with the democratic practices of their subjects, and not as categorically
prior to them. For recent scholarly work in legal pluralism, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos
& Csar A. Rodriguez-Garaviot, eds., Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a
Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jeremy Webber,
"Legal Pluralism and Human Agency" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 167.
41. Tully develops this feature in "Law, Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 25.
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radical sovereignty, and agonistic irresolution domestically and internationally,
and of bringing them in line. ' 42 These are strategies of what was referred to as
recuperation by followers of the Situationist International. However, just as no
abstract theory can ever perfectly emulate the world that it describes, the best that
the static structures of modernity can do is to chase an ever-changing world of
practices. It can only ever remain one step behind. Refusing to remain constricted
or confined, the fluid world of everyday practices constantly slips through the
cracks and crevices of a modernity that is constantly falling apart and having to
mend itself. The project of modernity is destined to remain unfinished.
It might be useful here to consider the city as the archetypal symbol of
modernity. Cities are almost by definition concentrations of people that are
larger than that which the local ecosystems upon which they are situated could
support on their own without the diversion of resources from other areas.
Consequently, cities require sustained efforts to reorder the existing ecosystems
in accordance with their own requirements. Today's major metropolitan areas
rely on massive and elaborate engineering systems sprawling vast distances in
order to divert resources such as food, energy, and water into the city and to
provide for the basic needs of urban dwellers. However, maintaining this kind
of imposed and structured order in an ecosystem proves a perpetually exhausting
task because ecosystems always seek to find and create their own structure of
equilibrium. 3
Still, regardless of the extent of our efforts to reshape the earth by placing a
human-derived structural order upon the tapestry of immanently emerging and
returning ecosystems, the world upon which these structures are imposed can
never be perfectly captured, fully contained, or made to strictly obey. At best,
the diversity of life from the underlying ecosystem can only ever be kept
temporarily at bay. If the city is to maintain its stable structural form and
prevent itself from returning to the earth, the encroaching ecosystem of life has
to be continuously recaptured, recuperated, and contained.
Even the human inhabitants of cities do not navigate through the city's
space or use it in a way that can ever be foreseen or planned. While high
modernists believed that a city could be designed down to the function of every
block and neighbourhood, such great schemes to improve the human condition
42. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 478.
43. Mike Davis, Dead Cities and Other Tales (New York: The New Press, 2003) at 361.
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are bound to fail. Immanent life never follows a predestined order and a city
can only ever take the shape of the people who use it. As Wittgenstein
remarked, ancient cities, like languages, are built as "a maze of little streets and
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various
periods"; built around this and surrounding it can be found "a multitude of
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.""
The stunning and optimistic conclusion that Tully takes from these insights
is that another world is not only possible (as often quipped by proponents of
the World Social Forum"5 ), but other worlds are in fact already actual. These
worlds, suppressed below modern constitutional law, exist, despite imperialism,
within what Tully refers to as the interstices of power and Spielraum ("room to
maneuvre")." As he succinctly explains, "there are subjugated and overlooked
'alternative worlds' or 'alternative modernities' of law and governance that exist
in the day-to-day practices of millions of people, despite the overarching
44. Wittgenstein, supra note 22 at 28.
45. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "The World Social Forum: A User's Manual," online:
Centro de Estudos Sociais <http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm-eng.pdf> [de Sousa
Santos, "A User's Manual"]; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "The World Social Forum:
Toward a Counter-Hegemonic Globalization" in Jai Sen et al., eds., The World Social Forum:
Challenging Empires (New Delhi: Viveka Foundation, 2004) 235, online:
<http://www.choike.org/nuevo-eng/informes/ 1 557.html>; and Janet Conway, "Citizenship
in a Time of Empire: The World Social Forum as a New Public Space" (2004) 8 Citizenship
Stud. 367 [Conway, "Citizenship in a Time of Empire"].
46. To see the development of these concepts in Tully's work, see "The Agonic Freedom," supra
note 21; "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom" in Duncan Ivison, Paul
Patton & Will Sanders, eds., Political Theory and the Rights oflndigenous Peoples (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 36; "An Ecological Ethics for the Present" in Brenden
Gleeson & Nicholas Low, eds., Governing for the Environment: Global Problems, Ethics and
Democracy (London: Macmillan, 2000) -147; and "Democracy and Globalization: A
Defeasible Sketch" in Ronald Beiner & Wayne Norman, eds., Canadian Political Philosophy:
Contemporary Reflections (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) 36. Tully refers to
"interstitial locations" for the first time in "Unfreedom of the Moderns," supra note 7. He
refers to Spielraum for the first time in "Recognition and Dialogue," supra note 27. See also
his more recent treatments of these ideas in Tully, "Law, Democracy and Imperialism," supra
note 25; "A New Kind of Euirope? Democratic Integration in the European Union" (2007)
10 Crit. Rev. of Intl. Soc. Polit. Philos. 71 [Tully, "A New Kind of Europe"]. For the most
complete treatment to date, see Tully, Public Philosophy, supra note 10. For an interesting
comparison with Tully's early work, see "Complex Issues: E.P. Thompson and the Peace
Movement" (1983) 16 Our Generation 60.
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hegemony and seeming inescapability of the particular western form of
constitutional democracy. 47 If it is the case that these alternative worlds are
already being practised beneath the radar of the modern gaze, then the project
of democratic constitutionalism is not the project of recuperation-finding an
even more universal or all-encompassing theory that will account for the
transcendental limits or forms of interaction that preceding theories have missed.
Rather, democratic constitutionalism is a project of detournement-proliferating
and strengthening the restricted pockets where non-imperial democratic relations
are already being practised, and exploiting the creative possibilities of "acting
otherwise" that exist all around us everyday, "within and against the constitutional
forms to which the governed are now subject." 8 In each situated locale and
together in their wondrous array of emergent forms, these creative practices of
democratic freedom hold the power to rebuild the world like Wittgenstein's
ancient city-one neighbourhood at a time.
It is not only Wittgenstein, or Tully, or the philosophers of practice who
have spoken to the importance of locally-situated practices. Indeed, many of the
world's 370 million Indigenous peoples, speaking in countless different ways
and languages, have long attested to the importance of living intimately with
the earth and all the other creatures who share the land, air, and water where we
find ourselves situated as earthly creatures. 9 Many have continued to practise
the ancient arts of living closely with the earth, despite the colonial forms of
abstract knowledge and formal institutions that are imposed upon their people
and their lands.
Nor is this only the message of the world's Indigenous peoples. Indigenous
and non-Indigenous peoples throughout the globe are quietly at work every day
47. Tully, "Democracy and Imperialism," supra note 2 at 491.
48. Ibid. at 489.
49. For an example of this message in writing, see E. Richard Atleo, Tsawalk: A Nuu-chahnulth
Worlaview (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005). For another example
from the perspective of a Buddhist worldview, see Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of
Understanding (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1988). These are just two examples of the countless
voices of people who largely remain unheard within the prevailing structural forms of
political philosophy and modern constitutional democracy. Although these voices remain on
the periphery of the dominant debates, because these particular exemplars have been
recorded in writing and published, their voices are one step closer to being noticed by the
predominant paradigms, which tend to place less validity on oral or other non-written
traditions or perspectives.
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remaking the world from the bottom up in their own situated locations. Theirs
are the voices least heard by the prevailing modern imperial worldviews.
Nevertheless, once we begin looking, examples of these practices reveal
themselves all around us in our own situated localities and beyond. To illustrate
the existence of such practices, I will offer five broad examples and will discuss
how each engages creatively with the modern constitutional legal order. By no
means is this list intended to provide a complete account of these activities. It
cannot, simply by virtue of the vast landscape of these diversely situated
practices that is being described.
The first broad type of creative practice is those of people who act otherwise
within and against existing modern legal and political institutions. This includes
the creative use of court systems to circumvent or exploit existing loopholes in
modern imperial law, or the creative engagement with electoral politics as
exemplified by Ejrcito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional (EZLN)'s otra
campafia-a campaign intended to encourage Mexicans to boycott the 2006
Mexican presidential elections in favour of building a parallel campaign of social
forces outside of the political system and emerging from the grassroots activism
of Mexican society.50 This broad type of practice can also include the creation
of locally-supported farms or co-operatives, and the creative use of mainstream
media, as the Yes Men51 have famously exemplified. Another excellent example
is Community Land Trusts (inspired by the Gandhian Bhoodan movement of
India) that seek to conserve land by encouraging proprietors to voluntarily place
their land holdings within strict legal covenants that are intended to remove the
land from the free market proprietary economy in perpetuity. 2 Although these
examples all work within or with the predominant legal institutions of the modern
state, they do so using creative rule-following practices with the intent of exposing
the limitations of these institutions and thereby subverting them. Though this
approach conceals well known limitations, there is the potential for people to
democratize institutions by employing them creatively in unconventional and
previously unexplored ways.
50. Subcomandante Marcos, The Other Campaign = La Otra Campafa (San Francisco: City
Lights, 2006).
51. The Yes Men, online: <http://www.theyesmen.org>.
52. See e.g. The Land Conservancy, online: <http://conservancy.bc.ca>; The E.F. Schumacher
Society, "Community Land Trusts," online: <http://smallisbeautiful.org/clts.html>.
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The second broad type of acting otherwise is the creation of parallel
institutions within the realm of civil society from which people then place
demands upon the prevailing legal structures. Certain non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) might come to mind here, as might the tactics of
non-violent civil disobedience employed by "anti-globalization" movements
since the successful shutdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
summit held in Seattle in 1999.13 The World Social Forum"6 might be yet
another example of this, as might independent media centres and independent
and internet radio broadcasts such as Democracy Now!,55 or musicians who
make use of mainstream media as a means through which to express their
dissent.56 As with the previous set of examples, these practices do not fall
outside of the law. However, they do not work directly within the specific
institutions of politics or the economy either. Instead, they work creatively
within the legally-constructed institution called civil society with the intention
of exposing the limits of hegemonic institutions. Many examples of these efforts
might be found in what Paul Hawken and the Wiser Earth Project call the
"largest and fastest growing movement in the world."
5
The third and fourth types of creative practices are both examples where
people practise non-participation and non-compliance with the modern
institutions of colonial hegemony. These examples attempt to create cultures,
communities, or institutions of grassroots participatory democracy which are
53. See Janet Thomas, The Battle in Seattle. The Story Behind the WTO Demonstrations (Golden,
CO: Fulcrum, 2000).
54. See Jai Sen et al, eds., The World Social Forum: Challenging Empires (New Delhi: Viveka
Foundation, 2004); de Sousa Santos, "A User's Manual," supra note 45; and Conway,
"Citizenship in a Time of Empire," supra note 45.
55. Democracy Now! "The War and Peace Report," online: <http://www.democracynow.org>.
56. One example of this last group might be the public concert performed by the rock group Rage
Against the Machine outside the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, calling
on people to reject both of the major political parties in the 2000 US Presidential elections.
57. See Paul Hawken, Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being
And Why No one Saw it Coming (London: Viking, 2007). For a "directory" of this
movement, see Wiser Earth, online: <http:www.wiserearth.org>. Still, Hawken's taxonomy
of this "movement" remains largely biased towards those participating within the frameworks
of NGOs and non-profits. This consequently misses the even larger array of people engaged
in resistance movements in their everyday life or communities that do not assume such a
formal structure and can thereby be even harder to see.
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intended to stand in parallel with the prevailing institutions. The third type can
include those examples where people have occupied interstitial spaces and
created autonomous, grassroots, democratic institutions."8 These spaces are then
defended with civil disobedience if confronted with hostility. This is the
insurgent tendency within this broad group of practices. Early examples might
include the Diggers movements of seventeenth-century England, or the maroon
societies in Jamaica which successfully managed to escape and evade the legal
institutions of modern slavery and live autonomously from colonial society.
More contemporary examples might include the autonomous municipios and
caracoles of the Zapatistas in Chiapas; the defence of the Radio Universidad in
Oaxaca; 9 landless peasants movements seeking to reoccupy abandoned
farmlands in Brazil and elsewhere throughout the world;6" the reoccupation of
abandoned factories in Argentina in the wake of the economic crash in 2002 as
well as other examples of syndicalism internationally;6 the blockades by
Indigenous peoples in North America attempting to defend their lands such as
those of the Grassy Narrows First Nation and Six Nations in Ontario; tree-sit
occupations to protect threatened ecosystems throughout North America; the
creation of community gardens in the abandoned spaces of urban environments
such as the People's Park in Berkeley; and urban squats in vacant and abandoned
buildings or villages found worldwide.
Although many communities have succeeded in sustaining autonomous
spaces of participatory community democracy for substantial lengths of time,
58. This is the approach being advocated and adopted by many contemporary anarchist
communities and writers. See e.g. Richard J.F. Day, Gramsci is Dead- Anarchist Currents in
the Newest Social Movements (Toronto: Pluto Press, 2005); George Katsiaficas, The .
Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements And The Decolonization Of
Everyday Life (Oakland: AK Press, 2006); and Gustav Landauer, For Socialism (St. Louis:
Telos Press, 1978). For an "anarcho-indigenous" perspective that advocates this approach,
see Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (New York: Oxford.
University Press, 1999); Taiaiake Alfred, Wasdse: Indigenous Pathways ofAction and Freedom
(Toronto: Broadview Press, 2005).
59. Un Poquito de Tanta Verdad = A Little Bit of So Much Truth, 2007, DVD (Seattle:
Corrugated Films, 2007).
60. See Brazil's Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), online: <http://
www.mstbrazil.org/?q=about>.
61. Marina Sitrin, ed., Horizontalism: Voice of Popular Power in Argentina (Oakland: AK Press,
2006).
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one disadvantage of this approach is that once these movements begin to visibly
occupy a territorial space, they reveal themselves and are exposed to the
potential use of force by the prevailing hegemonic institutions. Consequently,
much of the energy and creative possibility of these movements is diverted to
defending their efforts rather than to acts of creating something new.
Ultimately they are often quashed by the superior force of the state, as attested
to by the recent examples of the Southcentral Community Farm in Los Angeles
and Copenhagen's Ungdomshuset squat.
The fourth set of approaches to creating democratic communities that
exist in parallel to modern-colonial legal institutions are those which adopt
non-territorial forms of cultural subversion.62 Unlike the examples above that
attempt to occupy and confront hegemonic structures, this set of engaged
non-violent examples tends to subvert and evade those structures. This could
include such broad counter-cultural and artistic practices as underground
spoken word and hip-hop communities, political puppeteering, culture jamming,
and the creation of underground publications or "zines." " Guerrilla gardeners,
urban gleaners, and other communities attempting to live outside of the
monetary economy provide further examples. "Temporary-autonomous"
actions such as Food Not Bombs servings," Critical Mass bicycle rides,65
Reclaim the Streets festivities, and the creation of pirate radio stations66
could also be included here. These broad cultural practices of subversion are
much harder to restrain than their territorially bounded counterparts. The
non-territorial character of these resistances allow them to temporarily dissolve
in any one location, only to spontaneously and unpredictably re-emerge again
in a new context and with a new form. On the other hand, because these
movements are transient and nomadic, they risk sacrificing a degree of
continuity and cohesiveness.
62. For proponents of this approach, see Hakiem Bey, TA.Z: The TemporaryAutonomous Zone,
OntologicalAnarchy, Poetic Terrorism (Brooklyn, Autonomedia: 1985); Etienne de la Bodtie,
The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude (Montreal: Black Rose Books,
1974).
63. Amy Spencer, DIY. The Rise of Lo-Fi Culture (London: Marion Boyars, 2005).
64. C.T. Lawrence Butler & Keith McHenry, Food Not Bombs (Tuscon: See Sharp Press, 2000).
65. Chris Carlsson, ed., Critical Mass: Bicycling's Defiant Celebration (Oakland: AK Press, 2002).
66. For information about pirate radio stations, see Stephen Dunifer & Ron Sakolsky, Seizing
the Airwaves: A Free Radio Handbook (Oakland: AK Press, 2002).
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The fifth set of examples might be broadly defined as spiritual practices-
the non-violent practices of millions of people around the world who go about
their daily life cultivating an entirely new ethos that simply does not fit into the
dominant modular form described in the above sections. These types of
transformative practices of the self, including transformative acts of artistic
expression, are often so radically different from the established frameworks of
understanding that they prove either unseen by, or incomprehensible to, the
modern hegemonic culture and institutions." Nevertheless, their transformative
potential should not be discounted or underestimated.
This merely comprises a short list intended to encourage us to look beyond
the disciplinary limits of what we usually conceive of as "the political" or "the
juridical."68 By no means is this list exhaustive. Granted, there are many other
types of worlds and approaches, although many of these practices remain far
beneath the radar of the modern imperial gaze.69 Each unique approach holds
its potential for democratizing and de-imperializing the relations in its own
vicinity, just as each holds it own limitations. However, with each diverse
community working side by side in its own unique locality, these practices
comprise existing worlds of diverse and exciting potentiality.
67. This is what James C. Scott might call the "hidden transcripts" of the arts of resistance. See
James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990).
68. On this topic see Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005); Chantal
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); Wendy Brown, "At the Edge"
(2002) 30 Political Theory 556; and Tully, Public Philosophy, supra note 10.
69. For a discussion of some of the types of alternative worlds that already exist beneath the gaze
of the European constitutional project, see Tully, "A New Kind of Europe," supra note 46.
For more on the voices, stories, and bodies of knowledge that remain unheard by or
incomprehensible to the imperial gaze, see Mignolo, supra note 19.

